Xibo supports and maintains the current and prior major releases, with updates being provided to the latest minor release within that.
A full list of support is available on our website: https://xibosignage.com/docs/setup/supported-versions-and-environments
Please report (suspected) security vulnerabilities using the Security tab in this repository.
You will receive a response from us within 48 hours. If the issue is confirmed, we will release a patch as soon as possible depending on complexity but historically within a few days.
Deployment-time configuration that affects the CMS's security posture.
Every setting below is a PHP variable, set at deployment time and never in the admin UI:
- Docker (the supported install):
/var/www/cms/custom/settings-custom.php. Thecustom/directory is a persisted volume.web/settings.phplives inside the container and is recreated on a fresh one, so edits there are lost. - Manual installs:
web/settings.php, orweb/settings-custom.phpif yoursettings.phpincludes it — seeMANUAL_INSTALL.md.
SafeClient (lib/Helper/Guzzle/SafeClient.php) blocks outbound HTTP to RFC 1918,
link-local, IPv6 ULA and cloud-metadata addresses. That is the CMS's SSRF defence.
Setting $allowLocalNetworkRequests = true; removes it for every outbound request. The CMS
can then reach internal services and the AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints, which makes any
admin-settable URL — connector service URL, news feed URL, XMR address — a pivot into your
internal network. Don't enable it in production.
The CMS builds off-system URLs from the request's Host header: password-reset links, the
cmsAddress sent to the Xibo auth service, the PWA player manifest. A forged Host gives a
forged link.
Set it to the hostnames the CMS is reachable under:
$whitelistHosts = 'cms.example.com,cms-staging.example.com';HttpsDetect::getHost() then rejects any other Host and substitutes the first entry. Treat
this as required in production.
The client IP keys login/2FA/password-reset rate limiting and is recorded in audit logs, session history and XMDS display logs. By default it is the TCP peer address; no forwarded-for header is trusted, so a direct client cannot spoof it.
Behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, load balancer or CDN, set $trustedProxyIps to
the address your proxy connects to the CMS from — its source address, not the backend
addresses configured in the proxy:
$trustedProxyIps = '10.0.0.5,172.18.0.0/16';Exact IPs, CIDR ranges and wildcards all work, comma-separated, matched by
Xibo\Helper\IpTrust. The first field (%h) of the CMS web server's access log is the
address to use.
Never use a wildcard or a public range. Every listed address may assert any client IP, so widening the list hands out an unlimited rate-limit bypass and lets audit IPs be chosen freely.
Only X-Forwarded-For is trusted — not Forwarded, X-Real-IP or X-Cluster-Client-Ip.
Make sure your proxy sets X-Forwarded-For itself rather than relaying the client's value.
This is the only setting that grants trust for rate limiting and audit IPs.
WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS does not — see below.
Unset, behind a proxy: every user resolves to the proxy's address and shares one
rate-limit bucket, so one user's failed logins can rate-limit the rest. Setting the correct
value fixes it. WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS makes no difference here.
Wrong value, with FORCE_HTTPS on: the CMS reads the request as plain HTTP and
redirects to https://, the proxy forwards that back over HTTP, and the browser loops.
Correct the address rather than widening the list.
WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS (Settings > Network) predates $trustedProxyIps and only ever
decided whether to trust X-Forwarded-Proto for HSTS. It still feeds only
getHttpsDetectionTrustedProxyIpList(), never getTrustedProxyIpList(), rate limiting or
audit IPs.
It is editable by any super-admin.
HttpsDetect::isHttpsTrusted() decides the CSRF cookie's Secure flag, off-system URL
generation (getScheme()/getPort()/getRootUrl()/getBaseUrl()), HSTS issuance and the
FORCE_HTTPS redirect in State.php.
A real $_SERVER['HTTPS'] always wins. Otherwise X-Forwarded-Proto: https is honoured
only from an address on $trustedProxyIps or WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS. Set either,
and no other address can assert https.
With neither set there is nothing to check a claim against, so https is trusted from
any address rather than the install being read as plain HTTP. Each caller fails safe if that
claim is forged: browsers reject a Secure cookie over non-TLS, an https:// link is never
weaker than http://, browsers ignore HSTS over non-TLS, and skipping the FORCE_HTTPS
redirect only affects the attacker's own request.
This fallback covers HTTPS detection only.