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Security: xibosignage/xibo-cms

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Xibo supports and maintains the current and prior major releases, with updates being provided to the latest minor release within that.

A full list of support is available on our website: https://xibosignage.com/docs/setup/supported-versions-and-environments

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please report (suspected) security vulnerabilities using the Security tab in this repository.

You will receive a response from us within 48 hours. If the issue is confirmed, we will release a patch as soon as possible depending on complexity but historically within a few days.

Operator notes — security-relevant settings

Deployment-time configuration that affects the CMS's security posture.

Every setting below is a PHP variable, set at deployment time and never in the admin UI:

  • Docker (the supported install): /var/www/cms/custom/settings-custom.php. The custom/ directory is a persisted volume. web/settings.php lives inside the container and is recreated on a fresh one, so edits there are lost.
  • Manual installs: web/settings.php, or web/settings-custom.php if your settings.php includes it — see MANUAL_INSTALL.md.

$allowLocalNetworkRequests — leave at the default (false)

SafeClient (lib/Helper/Guzzle/SafeClient.php) blocks outbound HTTP to RFC 1918, link-local, IPv6 ULA and cloud-metadata addresses. That is the CMS's SSRF defence.

Setting $allowLocalNetworkRequests = true; removes it for every outbound request. The CMS can then reach internal services and the AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints, which makes any admin-settable URL — connector service URL, news feed URL, XMR address — a pivot into your internal network. Don't enable it in production.

$whitelistHosts — strongly recommended for production

The CMS builds off-system URLs from the request's Host header: password-reset links, the cmsAddress sent to the Xibo auth service, the PWA player manifest. A forged Host gives a forged link.

Set it to the hostnames the CMS is reachable under:

$whitelistHosts = 'cms.example.com,cms-staging.example.com';

HttpsDetect::getHost() then rejects any other Host and substitutes the first entry. Treat this as required in production.

$trustedProxyIps — required if the CMS sits behind a reverse proxy

The client IP keys login/2FA/password-reset rate limiting and is recorded in audit logs, session history and XMDS display logs. By default it is the TCP peer address; no forwarded-for header is trusted, so a direct client cannot spoof it.

Behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, load balancer or CDN, set $trustedProxyIps to the address your proxy connects to the CMS from — its source address, not the backend addresses configured in the proxy:

$trustedProxyIps = '10.0.0.5,172.18.0.0/16';

Exact IPs, CIDR ranges and wildcards all work, comma-separated, matched by Xibo\Helper\IpTrust. The first field (%h) of the CMS web server's access log is the address to use.

Never use a wildcard or a public range. Every listed address may assert any client IP, so widening the list hands out an unlimited rate-limit bypass and lets audit IPs be chosen freely.

Only X-Forwarded-For is trusted — not Forwarded, X-Real-IP or X-Cluster-Client-Ip. Make sure your proxy sets X-Forwarded-For itself rather than relaying the client's value.

This is the only setting that grants trust for rate limiting and audit IPs. WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS does not — see below.

Unset, behind a proxy: every user resolves to the proxy's address and shares one rate-limit bucket, so one user's failed logins can rate-limit the rest. Setting the correct value fixes it. WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS makes no difference here.

Wrong value, with FORCE_HTTPS on: the CMS reads the request as plain HTTP and redirects to https://, the proxy forwards that back over HTTP, and the browser loops. Correct the address rather than widening the list.

Why WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS is HTTPS-detection only

WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS (Settings > Network) predates $trustedProxyIps and only ever decided whether to trust X-Forwarded-Proto for HSTS. It still feeds only getHttpsDetectionTrustedProxyIpList(), never getTrustedProxyIpList(), rate limiting or audit IPs.

It is editable by any super-admin.

How X-Forwarded-Proto (HTTPS detection) is trusted

HttpsDetect::isHttpsTrusted() decides the CSRF cookie's Secure flag, off-system URL generation (getScheme()/getPort()/getRootUrl()/getBaseUrl()), HSTS issuance and the FORCE_HTTPS redirect in State.php.

A real $_SERVER['HTTPS'] always wins. Otherwise X-Forwarded-Proto: https is honoured only from an address on $trustedProxyIps or WHITELIST_LOAD_BALANCERS. Set either, and no other address can assert https.

With neither set there is nothing to check a claim against, so https is trusted from any address rather than the install being read as plain HTTP. Each caller fails safe if that claim is forged: browsers reject a Secure cookie over non-TLS, an https:// link is never weaker than http://, browsers ignore HSTS over non-TLS, and skipping the FORCE_HTTPS redirect only affects the attacker's own request.

This fallback covers HTTPS detection only.

Learn more about advisories related to xibosignage/xibo-cms in the GitHub Advisory Database